Abstract. The design and verification of cryptographic protocols is a notoriously difficult task, even in abstract Dolev-Yao models. This is mainly due to several sources of unboundedness (size of messages, number of sessions, . . . ). In this paper, we present a transformation which maps a protocol that is secure for a single session to a protocol that is secure for an unbounded number of sessions. The transformation is surprisingly simple, computationally light and works for arbitrary protocols that rely on usual cryptographic primitives, such as symmetric and asymmetric encryption as well as digital signatures. Our result provides an effective strategy to design secure protocols: (i) design a protocol intended to be secure for one session (this can be verified with existing automated tools); (ii) apply our transformation and obtain a protocol which is secure for an unbounded number of sessions. A side-effect of this result is that we characterize a class of protocols for which secrecy for an unbounded number of sessions is decidable.
Introduction
Security protocols are small distributed programs which aim at guaranteeing properties such as confidentiality of data, authentication of participants, etc. The security of these protocols relies on the one hand on the security of cryptographic primitives, e.g., encryption and digital signatures, and on the other hand on the concurrency related aspects of the protocols themselves. History has shown that even if cryptography is supposed to be perfect, such as in the classical DolevYao model [15] , the correct design of security protocols is notoriously error-prone. See for instance [6] for an early survey on attacks. These difficulties come mainly from two sources of unboundedness: a protocol may be executed several times (we get several protocol sessions) and the attacker is allowed to build messages of unbounded size. Indeed, secrecy is known to be undecidable when an unbounded number of sessions is allowed (e.g. [8] ), even if the message size is bounded [16] . However, when the number of sessions is bounded, and even without assuming a bounded message size, the problem becomes co-NP-complete [24] . Moreover, special purpose tools (e.g. [2] ) exist which are highly efficient when the number of sessions is small.
In this paper we propose a protocol transformation which maps a protocol that is secure for a single session to a protocol that is secure for an unbounded number of sessions. This provides an effective strategy to design secure protocols: (i) design a protocol intended to be secure for one session (this can be efficiently verified with existing automated tools); (ii) apply our transformation and obtain a protocol which is secure for an unbounded number of sessions.
Our transformation. Our transformation can be informally described as follows. Suppose that Π is a protocol between k participants A 1 , . . . , A k . The transformed protocol adds to Π a preamble
in which each participant sends a freshly generated nonce N i together with his identity to all other participants. This preamble allows each participant to compute a dynamic, session dependent tag: A 1 , N 1 , . . . , A k , N k . It will be used to tag each encryption and signature in Π. The transformation is surprisingly simple since it does not require any cryptographic protection of the preamble: the attacker is allowed to tamper with the messages exchanged during this phase and each participant may compute a different tag. Intuitively, the security relies on the fact that the participant A i decides on a given tag for a given session which is ensured to be fresh as it contains his own freshly generated nonce N i . In addition to its simplicity, the transformation is computationally light as it does not add any additional cryptographic application; it may merely increase the size of messages to be encrypted or signed. The transformation applies to a large class of protocols, which may use symmetric and asymmetric encryption, digital signature and hash function.
We may note that, en passant, we identify a class of tagged protocols for which security is decidable for an unbounded number of sessions. This directly follows from our main result as it stipulates that verifying security for a single session is sufficient to conclude security for an unbounded number of sessions.
Related Work. The kind of compiler we propose here has also been investigated in the area of cryptographic design in computational models, especially for the design of group key exchange protocols. For example, Katz and Yung [18] proposed a compiler which transforms a key exchange protocol secure against a passive eavesdropper into an authenticated protocol which is secure against an active attacker. Earlier work includes compilers for 2-party protocols (e.g. [4, 20] ). In the symbolic model, recent works [12, 3] allow one to transform a protocol which is secure in a weak sense (roughly no attacker [12] or just a passive one [3] and a single session) into a protocol secure in the presence of an active attacker and for an unbounded number of sessions. All of these works share however a common drawback: the proposed transformations make heavy use of cryptography. This is mainly due to the fact the security assumptions made on the input protocol are rather weak. As already mentioned in [12] , it is important, from an efficiency perspective to lighten the use of cryptographic primitives. In this work, we succeed in doing so at the price of requiring stronger security guarantees on the input protocol. However, we argue that this is acceptable since efficient automatic tools exist to decide this security criterion on the input protocols.
We can also compare our work with existing decidable protocol classes for an unbounded number of sessions. An early result is the PTIME complexity result by Dolev et al. [14] for a restricted class, called ping-pong protocols. Other classes have been proposed by Ramanujam and Suresh [22, 23] , and Lowe [19] . However, in both cases, temporary secrets, composed keys and ciphertext forwarding are not allowed which discards protocols, such as the Yahalom protocol (see also Section 4.3).
Outline of the paper. In Section 2 we describe the term algebra which is used to model protocol messages as well as the intruder capabilities to manipulate such terms. Then, in Section 3, we define the protocol language we use to model protocols. In Section 4 we formally describe our transformation and state our main transference result. Finally, in Section 5, we prove our main result before concluding. For readability, the proofs are given in the appendix.
Messages and intruder capabilities

Syntax
We use an abstract term algebra to model the messages of a protocol. For this we fix several disjoint sets. We consider an infinite set of agents A = { , a, b . . .} with the special agent standing for the attacker and an infinite set of agent variables X = {x A , x B , . . .}. We need also to consider an infinite set of names N = {n, m . . .} and an infinite set of variables Y = {y, z, . . .}. We consider the following signature F = {enc, enca, sign, , h, pub, priv, shk}. We suppose that the function symbols in F come with an arity: we have ar(f ) = 2 for f ∈ {enc, enca, sign, , shk} and ar(f ) = 1 for the remaining symbols. These function symbols model cryptographic primitives: represents pairing, enc, enca and sign represent symmetric encryption, asymmetric encryption and signature respectively, h represents the application of a hash function whereas pub(a) and priv(a) are used to model public and private keys of an agent a, and shk(a, b) (= shk(b, a)) is used to model the long-term symmetric key shared by agents a and b. Names are used to model atomic data such as nonces. The set of Terms is defined inductively by the following grammar:
f ∈ {pub, priv} and u is an agent or an agent variable | shk(u 1 , u 2 ) u 1 and u 2 are agents or agent variables | f (t 1 , t 2 ) application of a symbol f ∈ {enc, enca, sign, } | h(t) application of the hash symbol h
We sometimes write u 1 , . . . , u n instead of writing u 1 , , . . . , u n−1 , u n . . . . We say that a term is ground if it has no variable. We consider the usual notations for manipulating terms. We write vars(t) (resp. fresh(t), agent(t)) for the set of variables (resp. names, agents) occurring in t. We write St(t) for the set of subterms of a term t and we define the set of long-term secret keys of a term t as
Moreover, we define the set of encrypted subterms of a term t as
and the set of plaintexts of a term t, denoted plaintext(t), as the set of atomic data that occur in plaintext, i.e
, and − plaintext(u) = {u} otherwise.
All these notions are extended to sets of terms and to other kinds of term containers as expected. We denote by |S| the cardinality of a set S. shk(a, b) ). We have that vars(t) = ∅, i.e. t is ground, fresh(t) = {n}, agent(t) = {a, b}, lgKeys(t) = {priv(a), shk(a, b)} and plaintext(t) = {n, pub(a)}.
Substitutions are written σ = {x 1 → t 1 , . . . , x n → t n } where its domain is dom(σ) = {x 1 , . . . , x n }. The substitution σ is ground if all the t i are ground. The application of a substitution σ to a term t is written σ(t) or tσ.
Intruder capabilities
We model the intruder's abilities to construct new messages by the deduction system given in Figure 1 . The rules of the first line describe the composition rules and we refer to them as pairing, symmetric and asymmetric encryption, signature and hashing respectively. The second and the third lines describe the decomposition rules and the axiom. We refer to these rules as first and second projection, symmetric and asymmetric decryption respectively. The intuitive meaning of these rules is that an intruder can compose new messages by pairing, encrypting, signing and hashing previously known messages provided he has the corresponding keys. Conversely, he can decompose messages by projecting or decrypting provided he has the decryption keys. The intruder is also able to verify whether a digital signature sign(m, priv(a)) matches the message m provided he has the verification key pub(a). This does however not generate any new message and hence we do not model this capability in the deduction system. Our optional rule expresses that an intruder can retrieve the whole message from its signature. Whether this property holds depends on the actual signature scheme.
T priv( ) Fig. 1 . Intruder deduction system.
Therefore we consider this rule to be optional. Our results are independent of whether this rule is part of the deduction system or not. The two first rules of the forth line model the fact that the intruder knows all public datas, i.e. agents and public keys. And finally, the two last rules of the last line model the fact that the intruder knows his own long-term secret keys.
Definition 1 (Deducible). We say that a term u is deducible from a set of terms T , denoted T u, if there exists a tree such that the root is labeled by T u, every intermediate node is an instance of a rule given in Figure 1 , and the leaves are of the form T v with either
Example 2. The term n, shk(a, b) is deducible from {enc(n, shk(a, b)), shk(a, b)}.
Models for security protocols
In this section, we give a language for specifying protocols and define their execution in presence of an active attacker. The model we consider is rather standard (see for instance [24, 11] ).
Syntax
Our protocol model allows parties to exchange messages built from identities and randomly generated nonces using public key and symmetric encryption, digital signature and hashing. The individual behavior of each protocol participant is defined by a parametrized role. A role describes a sequence of events, i.e. a sequence of receiving and sending.
Definition 2 (Event, role and protocol). An event e is either a receive event, denoted rcv(u), or a send event, denoted snd(u), where u is a term. A role is of the form λx 1 . . . . λx k .νy 1 . . . . νy p . seq, where -X = {x 1 , . . . , x k } is a set of agent variables, the parameters of the role, corresponding to the k participants of the protocol, -Y = {y 1 , . . . , y p } is a set of variables representing the nonces generated by the role, -seq = e 1 ; e 2 ; . . . ; e is a sequence of events such that (vars(seq) {X}) ⊆ Y,
i.e. all agents variables are parameters.
Moreover, the sequence of events is such that for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ , we have that
The set of roles is denoted by Roles. The length of a role is the number of elements in its sequence of events. A k-party protocol is a mapping
The last condition on variables in send events ensures that each variable which appears in a sent term is either one of the parameters, nonces, or is a variable which has been bound by a previous receive event.
Example 3. We illustrate our protocol syntax on the familiar Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol [21] that is informally described below:
Agent A sends to B his identity together with a freshly generated nonce, encrypted with the public key of B. Agent B replies by copying A's nonce and adds a fresh nonce N B , encrypted by A's public key. The agent A acknowledges by forwarding B's nonce encrypted by B's public key. In our syntax this protocol is modeled as follows.
snd(enca( y, x A , pub(x B ))); rcv(enca( y, z , pub(x A ))); snd(enca(z, pub(x B )))
Clearly, not all protocols written using the syntax above are meaningful. In particular, some of them might not be executable, e.g. the role rcv(h(x)); snd(x). Actually, our result holds also for non executable protocols. We will see in Section 4 that we only need to ensure a weaker hypothesis (see Theorem 1, Condition 2).
Scenarios and sessions
In our model, a session corresponds to the instantiation of one role. This means in particular that one "normal execution" of a k-party protocol requires k sessions, one per role. We may want to consider several sessions corresponding to different instantiations of a same role. Since the adversary may block, redirect and send new messages, all the sessions might be interleaved in many ways. Such an interleaving is captured by the notion of a scenario.
Definition 3 (Scenario).
A scenario for a protocol Π : [k] → Roles is a sequence sc = (r 1 , sid 1 ) · · · (r n , sid n ) where r i is a role and sid i a session identifier such that 1 ≤ r i ≤ k, sid i ∈ N {0}, the number of identical occurrences of a pair (r, sid ) is smaller than the length of the role r, and sid i = sid j implies r i = r j .
The condition on identical occurrences ensures that a role cannot execute more events than it contains. The last condition ensures that a session number is not reused on other roles. We say that (r, s) ∈ sc if (r, s) is an element of the sequence sc.
Given a scenario and an instantiation for the parameters, we can define a symbolic trace, that is a sequence of events that corresponds to the interleaving of the scenario, for which the parameters have been instantiated, fresh nonces are generated and variables are renamed to avoid name collisions between different sessions.
Definition 4 (Symbolic trace). Let Π be a k-party protocol with
Given a scenario sc = (r 1 , sid 1 ) · · · (r n , sid n ) and a function α : N → A k , the symbolic trace tr = e 1 ; . . . ; e n associated to sc and α is defined as follows.
e. the number of previous occurrences in sc of the session sid i . We have q i ≤ ri and e i = (e A session sid is said to be honest w.r.t. α when α(sid ) ⊆ (A { })
k .
Intuitively, a session sid is honest if all of its participants, from the point of view of the agent playing the session sid , are honest (i.e. = ). We define an operator K which associates to a symbolic trace tr the knowledge gained by the adversary, i.e. the set of (possibly non ground) terms that are sent in this symbolic trace. More precisely, we have that K(e 1 ; · · · ; e ) = 1≤i≤ K(e i ) where K(rcv(u)) = ∅ and K(snd(u)) = {u}. This operator is useful in the following when we associate a constraint system to a symbolic trace.
Constraint systems
Constraint systems have been successfully used for verifying secrecy properties of finite scenarios (see for instance [24, 9, 13] ). We now recall the definition of constraint systems. In the next section we discuss how secrecy for an unbounded number of sessions can be specified using (infinite) families of constraint systems.
Definition 5 (Constraint system).
A constraint system C is either ⊥ or a finite sequence of expressions (T i u i ) 1≤i≤n , called constraints, where each T i is a finite set of terms, called the left-hand side of the constraint, and each u i is a term, called the right-hand side of the constraint, such that:
A solution of C is a ground substitution θ with dom(θ) = vars(C) such that for every (T u) ∈ C, we have that T θ uθ. The empty constraint system is always satisfiable whereas ⊥ denotes an unsatisfiable system.
The left-hand side of a constraint system usually represents the messages sent on the network. The second condition in Definition 5 says that each variable occurs first in some right-hand side. We denote by maxlhs(C) the maximal (for the inclusion) left-hand side of C, minlhs(C) its minimal (for the inclusion) lefthand side and by rhs(C) the set of its right-hand sides.
Secrecy
We now define the secrecy preservation problem for an unbounded number of sessions. Intuitively, a term m is secret if for all possible instantiations and scenarios, the ground term m obtained when all parameters and nonces have been instantiated during an honest session remains secret. This definition leads us to consider an infinite family of constraint systems.
Definition 6 (Secrecy). Let Π be a k-party protocol with
and let m ∈ St(e r i ) for some role 1 ≤ r ≤ k and 1 ≤ i ≤ r . We say that Π preserves the secrecy of m for the initial knowledge T 0 , if for any scenario sc, for any function α : N → A k and for any honest session sid h ( i.e. α(sid h ) ∈ (A { }) k ) such that (r, sid h ) ∈ sc, the following constraint system is not satisfiable
where tr is the symbolic trace of length associated to (sc, α), tr i its prefix of length i and σ r,sid h is the substitution defined in Definition 4.
Example 4. Consider again the Needham-Schroeder protocol. Let Π(1) and Π(2) be the two roles introduced in Example 3. This protocol is well-known to be insecure for any initial knowledge of the intruder T 0 w.r.t. m = y . Let sid 1 and sid 2 be two session numbers such that sid 1 = sid 2 and consider the scenario sc = (1, sid 1 ) (2, sid 2 ) (1, sid 1 ) (2, sid 2 ) and the function α such that α(sid 1 ) = (a, ) and α(sid 2 ) = (a, b). The constraint system C associated to T 0 , sc, α and mσ 2,sid2 = n y ,sid2 (according to Definition 6) is given below.
The substitution σ = {z sid2 → n y,sid1 , z sid1 → n y ,sid2 } is a solution of C. However this protocol preserves the secrecy of m when considering one honest session for each role. This has been formally verified with the AVISPA tool [2] . Our transference result (described in the next section) will ensure that the protcolΠ (protocol obtained from Π by applying our transformation) is secure for an unbounded number of sessions.
Transformation of protocols
In Section 4.1 we define our transformation before we state our main result (Theorem 1) whose proof is postponed to Section 5. Finally, we discuss the tags which are used in our transformation in Section 4.3.
Our transformation
Given an input protocol Π, our transformation will compute a new protocolΠ which consists of two phases. During the first phase, the protocol participants try to agree on some common, dynamically generated, session identifier τ . For this, each participant sends a freshly generated nonce N i together with his identity A i to all other participants. (Note that if broadcast is not practical or if not all identities are known to each participant, the message can be send to some of the participants who forward the message.) At the end of this preamble, each participant computes a session identifier:
Note that an active attacker may interfere with this initialization phase and may intercept and replace some of the nonces. Hence, the protocol participants do not necessarily agree on the same session identifier τ after this preamble. In fact, each participant computes his own session identifier, say τ j . During the second phase, each participant j executes the original protocol in which the dynamically computed identifier is used for tagging each application of a cryptographic primitive. In this phase, when a participant opens an encryption, he will check that the tag is in accordance with the nonces he received during the initialization phase. In particular he can test the presence of his own nonce. The transformation, using the informal Alice-Bob notation, is described below and relies on the tagging operation that is formally defined in Definition 7.
. . .
Note that, the Alice-Bob notation only represents what happens in a normal execution, i.e. with no intervention of the attacker. Of course, in such a situation, the participants agree on the same session identifier τ used in the second phase.
Definition 7 (Tagging). Let u be two terms and tag be a k-tag for some integer k. The tagging of u with tag, denoted [u] tag , is inductively defined as follows:
This notion is extended to sequences of events as expected. We are now able to formally define our transformation.
and the variables z j i (1 ≤ i, j ≤ k) not appearing in Π (which can always be ensured by renaming variables in Π). The transformed protocolΠ is a k-party protocol defined as follows:
, and
In the above definition, the protocolΠ init models the initialization phase and the variables z j i correspond to the nonces that are exchanged during this phase. In particular for the role j, the variable z j j is a freshly generated nonce while the other variables z j i , i = j, are expected to be bound to the other participant's nonces in the receive events. Remember also that the variables x j i are the role parameters which correspond to the agents. The tag computed by the j th role in our transformation consists in the concatenation of the k − 1 nonces received during the initialization phase together with the fresh nonce generated by the role j itself, i.e. z j j . We illustrate this transformation on the Needham-Schroeder protocol introduced in Section 2.
Example 5. Consider the Needham-Schroeder protocol described in Example 3. Applying our transformation we obtain a 2-party protocolΠ. The roleΠ(2) is described below. The roleΠ(1) can be obtained in a similar way.
where τ = x A , z A , x B , z B . Note that Lowe's famous man-in-the-middle attack does not exist anymore onΠ.
Main theorem
Theorem 1. Let Π be a k-party protocol andΠ be the corresponding transformed protocol according to Definition 8. Let T 0 be a finite set of terms (the intruder's initial knowledge). Let CK = lgKeys(Π) T 0 be the set of critical keys. Let m ∈ St(Π(j)) for some 1 ≤ j ≤ k andm be its counterpart inΠ(j). Moreover, we assume that:
1. critical keys do not appear in plaintext, i.e. CK ∩ plaintext(Π) = ∅; 2. for any role λx 1 . . . λx k .νy 1 . . . νy p .e 1 ; . . . ; e , for any i such that e i is a send event, for any variable x ∈ plaintext(e i ), we have x ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x k , y 1 , . . . , y p } or x ∈ plaintext(e j ) for some receive event e j such that j ≤ i.
If Π preserves the secrecy of m when considering one honest session of each role, thenΠ preserves the secrecy ofm (for an unbounded number of honest and dishonest sessions).
We have already seen that our dynamic tagging is useful to avoid interaction between different sessions of the same role in an execution (see Example 5) . A more detailed discussion follows in Section 4.3. Now, we discuss our other hypotheses. Condition 1. The first condition requires that critical keys do not appear in plaintext. Consider the following protocol.
There is an attack on the secrecy of y (a freshly generated nonce by Π(1)) which requires two instances of Π(2) played by b (with a). Indeed, after one session of the role Π(2), the attacker may learn the long-term key shk(a, b) and after two sessions, he additionally learns the long-term key priv(a). Then the attacker is able to deduce shk(a, b), priv(a) and to decrypt the ciphertext containing the secret. Such an attack can still be mounted after applying our transformation. However, we have to consider two instances of Π(1) since two instances of Π(2) will never accept to decrypt two ciphertexts issued from the same instance of Π(1). This example is not a counter-example of our main result since condition 1 is not satisfied. Intuitively, Condition 1 disallows the sending of long-term secrets in a plaintext position (even under an encryption). This is generally satisfied by protocols and considered as a prudent engineering practice.
Condition 2. While this condition is necessary for our result to hold it is not really restrictive and only discards protocols that are intuitively non-executable. Indeed, it is easy to construct a protocol where critical keys are only used at key positions, but appear at a plaintext position with a sequence of the form rcv(enc(x, z)); snd(z). Hence, we can easily construct a counter-example like the one described above which satisfies Condition 1 but which does not satisfy Condition 2.
Our result states that if a protocol admits an attack then there exists an attack which only requires one honest session of each role. The situation is however slightly more complicated than it may seem at first sight since there is an infinite number of honest sessions, which one would need to verify separately. The following result by Comon and Cortier [7] however allows us to avoid this combinatorial explosion: when verifying secrecy properties it is sufficient to consider one single honest agent (which is allowed to "talk to herself"). Hence we can instantiate all the parameters with the same agent a ∈ A { }.
Other ways of tagging
First we notice that it is important for our tags to be collaborative, i.e., all participants do contribute by adding a fresh nonce. Our main theorem would for instance not hold if the tag consists of a single nonce chosen by only one of the participants.
Example 6. Consider the following 2-party protocol.
We are interested in the secrecy of the nonce N b generated by the role B. This protocol admits an attack (see below) that requires two honest sessions of the role B and works as follows. After one normal execution of the protocol, the attacker sends to B a message of the expected form. He forges the first part of the message using a fake key K i whereas he reuses, for the second part, the signature eavesdropped during the execution of the first session. Then, B sends a fresh nonce N b encrypted under K i . The attacker is now able to deduce the secret N b .
Note that such an attack (requiring two sessions of the role B) exists -even if we add static tags, i.e. a different constant inside each encryption and signature, and -even if the tag contains a fresh nonce generated by A.
This example illustrates that the contribution of B is crucial to prevent such attacks.
We have also considered an alternate, slightly different transformation. It is defined as the previous transformation (Definition 8), but does not include the identities in the tag, i.e., the tag is simply the sequence of nonces. In that case we obtain a different result: if a protocol admits an attack then there exists an attack which only requires one (not necessarily honest) session for each role. In this case, we need to additionally check for attacks that involve a session engaged with the intruder. On the example of the Needham-Schroeder protocol the man in the middle attack is not prevented by this weaker tagging scheme. However, the result requires one to also consider one dishonest session for each role, hence including the attack scenario.
Finally, different kinds of tags have also been considered in [1, 5, 22] . However these tags are static and have a different aim. While our dynamic tagging scheme avoids confusing messages from different sessions, these static tags avoid confusing different messages inside a same session. However, these tags do not prevent that a same message is reused in two different sessions. Under some additional assumptions (e.g. no temporary secret, no ciphertext forwarding), several decidability results [23, 19] have been obtained by showing that it is sufficient to consider one session per role. In the framework we consider here, the question whether such static tags would be sufficient to obtain decidability is still an open question (see [1] ). Note that Example 6 relies on a temporary secret.
In a similar way, static tags have also been used by Heather et al. [17] to avoid type confusion attacks.
Proof of our main result
The proof of our main result is closely tied to a particular procedure for solving constraint systems (see [13, 10, 11] ). We therefore first give a brief description of this procedure before outlining the proof itself.
Constraint solving procedure
The procedure we consider for constraint solving uses simplification rules that transform a given constraint system into another, simpler one. Such a simplification step is denoted C σ C where σ is a substitution that has been applied to C during this step. When the substitution is omitted it implicitly refers to the identity function. We also write C n σ C for a sequence of n steps where σ is the composition of the substitutions applied at each step. The procedure has been shown to be sound, complete and terminating [10] . This means that the procedure always terminates after a finite number of steps resulting either in ⊥ when no solution exists or in a constraint system in solved form. A constraint system is in solved form when the right-hand side of each constraint is a variable. In that case the constraint system can be trivially solved by substituting each of these variables by a term t 0 such that minlhs(C) t 0 , e.g. . Moreover, if there is a simplification sequence C n σ C where C is in solved form then σ (extended to substitute the remaining variables by t 0 ) is a solution of C. The inference system we consider (see Figure 1) is slightly different from the one used in [10] . However, it is not difficult to show that the procedure described below is still sound, complete and terminating.
For the purpose of our proof, we decorate each term t by a pair (r, s) which denotes the role number and the session identifier in which t originated. The resulting term t (r,s) is called a labeled term. By convention, terms in T 0 (the initial knowledge of the intruder) are labeled with (0, 0). These decorations do not influence the procedure but provide additional information that is useful in the proof. We could have added these decorations in Definition 4 when constructing the symbolic trace, but it would increase notational clutter and harm readability.
if σ = mgu(t, u) where t ∈ St(T ), t = u, t, u are neither variables nor pairs
if σ = mgu(t1, t2), t1, t2 ∈ St(T ), t1 = t2, t1, t2 are neither variables nor pairs
Fig. 2. Simplification rules
We extend all notations defined on terms to labeled terms, by providing a session identifier as an additional argument: e.g. vars(T, sid) = t (i,sid ) ∈T vars(t).
Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 is proved by contradiction. Assume thatΠ admits an attack. This means that there exists a scenario sc, a function α : N → A k and an honest session sid h such that the associated constraint system C (according to Definition 6) is satisfiable. We will prove that the constraint system C associated to sc (the subsequence of sc where we only consider some particular sessions, say S, chosen according to the tag τ sid h involved in the encrypted subterms of the honest session sid h ) and α, is also satisfiable. Intuitively sid ∈ S if and only if the nonce generated during the initialisation phase of the session sid appears in tag τ sid h at the expected position, i.e. at the r th position where r is the role associated to the session identifier sid . Initially, we have that C = C| S according to the following definition.
Definition 9 (constraint system C| S ). Let C be a constraint system and S a set of session identifiers, we define the restriction of C to S as follows
where T | S = {v (r,s) ∈ T | s ∈ S ∪ {0}}.
We want to ensure that the simplification steps are stable by restriction to some well-chosen set S of sessions (see Lemma 2) . While this property does not hold for general constraint systems we show below that it is the case for well-formed constraint systems.
Our notion of well-formed constraint systems relies on some additional definitions. A k-tag is a term composed of k pairs a, u where a ∈ A and u ∈ Terms. We say that a term is k-tagged if all its encrypted subterms are tagged with a k-tag , i.e. ∀u ∈ EncSt(t), ∃tag, u 1 , . . . , u n . u = f ( tag, u 1 , . . . , u n )
We denote by tags(t) the set of k-tags which occur in a tagging position in t.
Definition 10 (Well-formed).
A constraint system C = T 1 u 1 ∧ . . . ∧ T n u n is well-formed w.r.t. a set T of k-tagged labeled terms if the following hold:
1. maxlhs(C) ⊆ T and rhs(C) ⊆ St(T ); 2. the constraint system C satisfies the plaintext origination property, i.e. if x ∈ vars(plaintext(T i )) then ∃ j < i such that x ∈ vars(plaintext(u j )); 3. for all sid we have that |tags(T, sid )| ≤ 1; 4. for all sid 1 , sid 2 , such that tags(T, sid 1 ) = tags(T, sid 2 ), we have that vars(T, sid 1 ) ∩ vars(T, sid 2 ) = ∅ ∧ fresh(T, sid 1 ) ∩ fresh(T sid 2 ) = ∅.
Intuitively, Condition 1 states that the terms in C are k-tagged. Condition 2 ensures that any variable appearing as a plaintext has been previously received in a plaintext position. Condition 3 says that all terms that originated in the same session have the same tag. Finally, Condition 4 ensures that sessions that are currently tagged in different ways in C use different variables and different nonces. Note that terms issued from different sessions are not necessarily tagged differently. First, we show that the simplification rules maintain well-formedness. Lemma 1. Let T be a set of k-tagged labeled terms, and C be a constraint system well-formed w.r.t. T . Let D be a constraint system, σ be a substitution and n be an integer such that C n σ D. Then, we have that D is well-formed w.r.t. T σ and, for any session sid , we have that tags(T σ, sid) = (tags(T, sid))σ.
Relying on Lemma 1 we show that there exists a derivation from C| S to a constraint system in solved form, i.e. the existence of an attack involving only sessions in S.
Lemma 2. Let CK be a set of long-term keys, T be a set of k-tagged labeled terms and C be a constraint system well-formed w.r.t. T and such that -lgKeys(C) CK ⊆ minlhs(C) and those terms are labeled with (0, 0), and -CK ∩ plaintext(maxlhs(C)) = ∅.
Let D be a constraint system that is satisfiable, σ be a substitution and n be an integer such that C This lemma is proved by induction. The proof is technical and the details can be found in the appendix. We consider the different rules and distinguish several cases depending on whether the terms involved are labeled with a session identifier in S or not. For instance, the rules R 5 (resp. R 4 and R 6 ) are mimiced by using the same instance of the same rule when the labeled term u (r,sid) (right hand side of the constraint) is such that sid ∈ S. Otherwise, we keep the constraint system unchanged. For the rules R 2 (resp. R 3 ) the key point is that terms which are tagged differently cannot be unified and do not share any variables nor fresh names (this is due to well-formedness). Thus, the unifier σ used in this step involved two terms labeled by sid 1 and sid 2 that are either both in S or both not in S. This is due to the fact that, after application of σ, these two terms will be tagged in the same way and thus by definition of S, have the same status. If both are in S, we can apply the same rule. If none of them is in S, we show that σ has no effect and we keep the constraint system unchanged. The case of the rule R 1 can also be proved in a similar way.
In order to pursue the proof of Theorem 1, we apply Lemma 2 on the derivation C n σ D witnessing the existence of an attack onΠ and we consider S = {sid | tags(T σ, sid) = tags(T σ, sid h )}, i.e. the sessions that are tagged in the same way that sid h . We obtain that C| S can also reach a constraint system in solved form, namely D| S . Moreover, the satisfiability of C| S witnesses the fact that there is an attack onΠ that only involves sessions in S. Now, in order to conclude, it remains to show that:
1. S does not contain two distinct sessions that execute the same role. Intuitively, this comes from the fact that sessions in S are tagged in the same way (after application of σ) and this is not possible for two distinct sessions that execute the same role. Indeed, the fresh nonce generated by different sessions of the same role ensures that their tag are distinct. 2. S only contains honest sessions. First sid h is an honest session by definition of the secrecy property. Second, since the names of the agents engaged in a role occur in the tag and sessions in S are tagged in the same way as the session sid h , we conclude that this property is also true for any sid ∈ S.
Thus, there is an attack onΠ that involves at most one honest session of each role. To conclude, it is easy to see that this attack can also be mounted on the protocol Π.
Conclusion and future work
In this paper we proposed a protocol transformation which transfers security against active adversaries for one protocol session to security against active adversaries for an unbounded number of sessions. By strengthening the security hypothesis on the input protocols with respect to other existing work, our obtained transformation is surprisingly simple and computationally light. As security for a single session can efficiently be verified with existing tools, this result provides an appealing protocol design strategy. Our current result applies to transfer secrecy properties. As future work we foresee to extend the scope of our result to other security properties, e.g. authentication or more challenging equivalence based properties. We also plan to extend the result to other intruder theories. We foresee that such results require new proof methods which are not based on the decision procedure as in this paper, but directly on the semantics. Another challenging topic for future research is to obtain more fine-grained characterizations of decidable classes of protocols for an unbounded number of sessions. The new insights gained by our work seem to be a good starting point to extract the conditions needed to reduce the security for an unbounded number of sessions to security for a finite number of sessions.
A Proof of Lemma 1
Before we prove Lemma 1, we first introduce some useful lemmas.
Lemma 3. Let T be a set of k-tagged labeled terms such that
Lemma 3 can be proved by induction on the algorithm that computes the most general unifier.
Moreover we can easily show that,
Lemma 4. Let T be a set of k-tagged labeled terms such that 1. ∀sid we have that |tags(T, sid)| ≤ 1, and 2. ∀sid, sid , such that tags(T, sid) = tags(T, sid ), we have that
∈ T , and t 1 ∈ EncSt(u 1 ), t 2 ∈ EncSt(u 2 ) unifiable with σ = mgu(t 1 , t 2 ). Then T σ is a set of k-tagged labeled terms such that 3. ∀sid we have that |tags(T σ, sid )| ≤ 1, and 4. ∀sid, sid such that tags(T σ, sid) = tags(T σ, sid ), we have that
Proof. We first show that T σ is a set of k-tagged labeled terms, i.e. that for all t ∈ T σ, t is k-tagged, or equivalently that for all u ∈ EncSt(T σ), u = f ( tag, u 1 , . . . , u n ) for some k-tag tag. We have that u ∈ EncSt(T σ) is equivalent to:
We show that in both cases u = f ( tag, u 1 , . . . , u n ) for some k-tag tag.
-Suppose there exists v ∈ EncSt(T ) such that u = vσ. Then v is of the form f ( tag , v 1 , . . . , v n ) with f ∈ {enc, enca, sign, h}, tag some k-tag, and u = f ( tag σ, v 1 σ , . . . , v n σ), i.e. tag = tag σ. We show by induction on k that tag σ is a k-tag. If k = 1, tag is by definition of the form a, t with a ∈ A, and t ∈ Terms. So, tag σ = a, tσ and tσ ∈ Terms. Thus, tag = tag σ is a 1-tag. Suppose now that k > 1, then tag is, by definition of a k-tag, of the form a, t , tag , for some a ∈ A, some t ∈ Terms, and some (k − 1)-tag tag . So tag σ = a, tσ , tag σ and by induction it is the case that tag σ is a (k − 1)-tag. So tag σ = a, tσ , tag σ is by definition a k-tag. -Suppose there exists x ∈ vars(T ) such that u ∈ EncSt(σ(x)). By lemma 3 we know that σ(x) is k-tagged. By definition of a k-tagged term we have that u = f ( tag, u 1 , . . . , u n ) for some k-tag tag.
Now we proceed with the proof of points 3 and 4 of the lemma. We recall here that tags(T σ, sid 1 ) = tags(T σ, sid 2 ) (Lemma 3).
3. let sid be a session. We need to distinguish two cases (a) tags(T σ, sid) = tags(T σ, sid 1 ). Thus tags(T, sid) = tags(T, sid 1 ), and tags(T, sid) = tags(T, sid 2 ). By condition 2 we know that vars(T, sid) ∩ vars(T, sid 1 ) = ∅, and that vars(T, sid) ∩ vars(T, sid 2 ) = ∅, thus vars(T, sid) ∩ dom(σ) = ∅ from which it follows that tags(T σ, sid) = tags(T, sid), thus |tags(
By Lemma 3 we have that
and since |tags(T, sid 1 )| ≤ 1 from condition 1 of the present lemma, |tags(T σ, sid)| = |σ(tags(T, sid 1 ))| ≤ 1.
4. Let sid and sid be two sessions such that tags(T σ, sid) = tags(T σ, sid ), and let r be the role played by session sid, and r the role played by session sid . We distinguish three cases: (a) tags(T σ, sid) = tags(T σ, sid 1 ) and tags(T σ, sid ) = tags(T σ, sid 1 ). So it immediately follows that , tags(T, sid) = tags(T, sid 1 ), tags(T, sid) = tags(T, sid 2 ), tags(T, sid ) = tags(T, sid 1 ), and tags(T, sid ) = tags(T, sid 2 ), and thus
implying that:
Now, since tags(T σ, sid) = tags(T σ, sid ), it is necessarily the case that tags(T, sid) = tags(T, sid ), so by hypothesis vars(T, sid)∩vars(T, sid ) = ∅ and fresh(T, sid)∩fresh(T, sid ) = ∅ So,
and,
Now, since tags(T σ, sid) = tags(T σ, sid ) it is necessarily the case that tags(T, sid) = tags(T, sid ), and thus vars(T, sid) ∩ vars(T, sid ) = ∅ and fresh(T, sid) ∩ fresh(T, sid ) = ∅.
For the same reason, we also have that vars(T,
Moreover, we have that vars(T, sid ) ∩ vars(T, sid 1 ) = ∅ and also that vars(T, sid ) ∩ vars(T, sid 2 ) = ∅. This implies vars(T, sid ) ∩ dom(σ) = ∅, and by mimicking the argument of (4a), we also have that vars(T σ, sid ) = vars(T, sid ), fresh(T σ, sid ) = fresh(T, sid ). Finally,
(c) tags(T σ, sid ) = tags(T σ, sid 1 ) -analogous to the previous case.
Lemma 5 ([11] , Lemma 11). Let T be a set of terms and u be a term such that T u. Then, we have that plaintext(u) ⊆ plaintext(T ). Lemma 1. Let T be a set of k-tagged labeled terms, and C be a constraint system well-formed w.r.t. T . Let D be a constraint system, σ be a substitution and n be an integer such that C n σ D. Then, we have that D is well-formed w.r.t. T σ and, for any session sid , we have that tags(T σ, sid) = (tags(T, sid))σ.
Proof. We prove this result by induction on the length n of the derivation. Base Case: n = 0. In such a case, we have that D = C and we easily conclude.
Induction
Step: n ≥ 1. In such a case, there exists a constraint system E and substitutions σ 1 , σ 2 such that
In order to conclude by induction, we show by case analysis on the simplification rule R involved in the first step of derivation that E is well-formed w.r.t. T σ 1 , and that tags(T σ 1 , sid) = σ 1 (tags(T, sid)) for any session sid. Then, it will be easy to conclude by applying our induction hypothesis.
Case R = R 1 . In such a case, there exists C , U, u, r and sid such that
The only delicate point in order to conclude in C 's well-formedness with respect to T σ 1 = T , is to show that C satisfies the plaintext origination property. Suppose it doesn't, then we are necessarily in the situation where i/ ∃y ∈ plaintext(u), ii/ ∃(V v (r ,sid ) ) ∈ C s.t. U V and y ∈ plaintext(V ), and iii/ ∀(W w (r ,sid ) ) ∈ C , s.t.W V and y ∈ plaintext(w). But from lemma 5, we know that since
-if y ∈ U , then since (U u) ∈ C, and C satisfies the plaintext origination property, necessarily exists (W w) ∈ C such that y ∈ plaintext(w) and W U . Thus, (W w) ∈ C with W V and y ∈ plaintext(w) exist and contradicts iii/ -if y ∈ {x | U x ∈ C, U U } u, then exists (W y) ∈ C with W U , and thus exists (W y) ∈ C with W V . Here again we are confronted to a contradiction with iii/.
Thus, C satisfies the plaintext origination property. Moreover, since we have that σ 1 is the identity and E is a subset of deducibility constraints of C, we easily conclude for the other conditions of well-formednes. Finally, since σ 1 = id, ∀sid tags(T σ 1 , sid) = tags(T, sid) = tags(T, sid)σ 1 .
Case R = R 4 . In such a case, we have that σ 1 is the identity and E is a subset of deducibility constraints of C. Thus, we easily conclude. Case R = R 5 or R 6 . In this case, it is also easy to conclude since σ 1 is the identity and we only decompose a term in rhs(C). Thus, we have that E is well-formed w.r.t. T σ 1 = T and that tags(T σ 1 , sid) = tags(T, sid) = tags(T, sid)σ 1 . Case R = R 2 or R 3 . We give the details below when R = R 2 , the case R = R 3 can be done in a similar way. In such a case, there exist C , U , u, v, w, r, and sid such that:
where σ 1 = mgu(u, v) and v ∈ EncSt(w). It is easy to see that maxlhs(E) ⊆ T σ 1 and rhs(E) ⊆ St(T σ 1 ). Then, we conclude for the remaining conditions of wellformedness thanks to Lemma 4. Moreover, the plaintext origination property is stable under unification, and thus tags(T σ 1 , sid) = tags(T, sid) = tags(T, sid)σ 1 .
B Proof of Lemma 2
Before proving Lemma 2, we recall the following lemma from [11] that allow us to ensure that critical keys never appear in plaintext.
Lemma 6 ([11]
, Lemma 12) . Let CK be a set of long-term keys, C be a constraint system satisfying the plaintext origination property (see Definition 10) such that CK ∩ plaintext(maxlhs(C)) = ∅ and σ be a substitution. If Cσ is satisfiable, then CK ∩ plaintext(maxlhs(Cσ)) = ∅.
Let D be a constraint system that is satisfiable, σ be a substitution and n be an integer such that C Proof. Let tag be a k-tag and S = Sid (tag) (as defined in Lemma 2) . From now on, we assume that there exists s ∈ S. Otherwise the result is obvious. We show the result by induction on the length n of the derivation C n σ D. Base Case: n = 0. In such a case, we have C = D, and thus C| S = D| S . This allows us to conclude.
Induction
In order to conclude by induction, we show by case analysis on the simplification rule R involved in the first derivation step that we are in one of the following cases:
and E is a constraint system well-formed w.r.t. T σ 1 (thanks to Lemma 1), lgKeys(E) CK ⊆ minlhs(E) and those terms are labeled with (0, 0) (obvious); and lastly we have that CK ∩ plaintext(maxlhs(E)) = ∅ (thanks to Lemma 6). This will allows us to conclude by applying our induction hypothesis.
Case R = R 4 . It would lead to D = ⊥ which contradicts the fact that the constraint system D is supposed to be satisfiable.
Case R = R 5 or R 6 . We give the details below when R = R 5 , the case R = R 6 can be done in a similar way. In such a case there exist C , U , u, v, f , r and sid such that
-If sid ∈ S, then (U | S u (r,sid) ) ∈ C| S , and thus C| S = E| S . -If sid ∈ S, then we have that C| S E| S :
Case R = R 2 or R 3 . We give the details below when R = R 2 , the case R = R 3 can be done in a similar way. In such a case, there exist C , U , u, v, w, r, and sid such that:
where σ 1 = mgu(u, v) and v ∈ EncSt(w) with w (r ,sid ) ∈ T for some r and sid . We distinguish two cases:
-If sid ∈ S, then (U | S u (r,sid) ) ∈ C| S , and thus E| S = C σ 1 | S . By hypothesis, we have that C is well-formed w.r.t. T . By definition of S and since sid ∈ S, we have that sid ∈ S. We also have that tags(T, sid) = tags(T, s) (resp. tags(T, sid ) = tags(T, s)) for any s ∈ S. By Lemma 1, we infer that vars(T, sid) ∩ vars(T, s) = vars(T, sid ) ∩ vars(T, s) = ∅ for any s ∈ S. Thus, dom(σ 1 ) ∩ vars(T, s) for any s ∈ S. So
Thus tags(T σ, sid ) = tag and from the definition of S, we have that w (r ,sid ) ∈ U | S . Hence, we have that
(r,sid) . So, we easily conclude that C| S σ1 E| S , and by definition of
Case R = R 1 . In such a case, there exist C , U , u, r and sid such that
. This is done by induction (on the prooftree witnessing U ∪{x | (U x) ∈ C, U U } u (r,sid) ). If u is public data of the form a or pub(a), for some a ∈ A, and since T u for all T (see last line of Figure 1 ), necessarily we have that
Otherwise, the only case for which we do not conclude by induction is when the last rule of the proof is the axiom, i.e. when u (r ,sid ) ∈ U for some r and sid . We then need to analyze the form of u:
-Case: u is a variable. We know from the fact that C is well-formed w.r.t. T that tags(T, sid) = tags(T, sid ) (= tag) (condition 4 of the definition of wellformed), and thus from the definition of C| S we necessarily have u (r ,sid ) ∈ U | S . So, U | S u (r,sid) .
-Case: u ∈ f resh(T, sid). Again, from the fact that C is well-formed w.r.t. T , we know that tags(T, sid) = tags(T, sid ) (= tag) (condition 4 of the definition of well-formed), and from the definition of C| S we have u (r ,sid ) ∈ U | S . So, U | S u (r,sid) .
-Case: u ∈ CK. By hypothesis we have that CK ∩ plaintext(maxlhs(C)) = ∅, but u ∈ U ⊆ maxlhs(C) would imply that u ∈ plaintext(maxlhs(C)) (according to Lemma 5) .This contradicts the fact that CK ∩ plaintext(maxlhs(C)) = ∅.
-Case: u ∈ lgKeys(C) CK. By hypothesis, we have that lgKeys(C) CK ⊆ minlhs(C) and those terms are labeled with (0, 0). Thus, we have that u ∈ U | S , thus U | S u (r,sid) .
-Case: u = f (u 1 , u 2 ) with f ∈ {enc, enca, sign}. In such a case u 1 is of the form tag , u 1 for some k-tag tag and u 1 , thus tags(T, sid ) = tag and by definition of S, we have that sid ∈ S; thus u (r ,sid ) ∈ U | S . So, U | S u (r,sid) .
-Case: u = h(u ). This case is analogous to the previous one.
-Case: u = u 1 , u 2 . If there exists u ∈ EncSt(u) then we necessarily have tags(u) = tag for some k-tag tag , and thus u (r ,sid ) ∈ U | S allowing us to conclude as in the previous case. Otherwise, u is obtained only by applying the pairing function over some atomic data D. In this case, we conclude by showing that each d ∈ D is deducible from U | S . The reasoning is similar to the ones performed for the above first two cases together with the case where d is public data.
In both cases (sid ∈ S or sid ∈ S), since σ 1 = id, obviously σ| S = id, we can thus conclude the proof.
C Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. SupposeΠ admits an attack onm ∈ St(Π(r)) for some role r and some initial knowledge T 0 . This means that there exist a scenario sc, a function α : N → A k , an honest session sid h (with (r, sid h ) ∈ sc) such that the corresponding constraint system C (as given in Definition 6) with T 0 ∪ K(tr) mσ r,sid h (where tr is the symbolic trace associated to sc and α) is satisfiable. We first show that there is an attack onΠ that involves at most one honest session of each role. Since C is satisfiable, there exists a constraint system D in solved form, a substitution σ, and a natural number n such that: C n σ D. Let T = maxlhs(C) ∪ rhs(C). We have that T is a set of k-tagged labeled terms and it is easy to check that the constraint system C is well-formed w.r.t. T . Condition 2 is ensured thanks to Condition 2 of Theorem 1. Thanks to Lemma 1, we have that D is well-formed w.r.t. T σ and thus for any sid , we have that tags(T σ, sid) = tags(T, sid)σ, and that |tags(T σ, sid)| ≤ 1. We distinguish two cases depending on the cardinality of |tags(T σ, sid h )|. Case: tags(T σ, sid h ) = ∅. In such a case, we have in particular thatm is a term obtained by applying pairing function symbols over some atomic data and also that there is no encrypted subterm involved in the role Π(r). Otherwise |tags(T σ, sid h )| would be greater than or equal to 1. In such a case, this means that there is an attack onΠ that involves only the session sid h that is honest. Hence the result.
Case: |tags(T σ, sid h )| = 1. Let tag = tags(T σ, sid h ) and S = {sid | tags(T σ, sid ) = tag}. Let CK = lgKeys(C) T 0 . The two additional conditions required to apply Lemma 2 are satisfied (thanks in particular to our Condition 1 in Theorem 1). From Lemma 2 we know that there exists a natural number m ≤ n such that C| S m σ D| S where σ = σ| X and X = sid∈S vars(C, sid ). Since D is in solved form so is D| S ; hence, C| S is satisfiable. Note that C| S corresponds to the constraint system associated to sc = sc| S (i.e. the subsequence of sc where we only keep sessions in S) and α = α| S . Thus, this means that there is an attack onm involving only sessions that are in S.
What it remains to show is that S contains at most one honest session of each role. In order to achieve this, we prove that two distinct sessions sid 1 and sid 2 that are in S and that execute the same role r cannot be tagged in the same way in T σ , i.e. tags(T σ , sid 1 ) = tags(T σ , sid 2 ). Let sid 1 , sid 2 ∈ S be two distinct sessions of the same role r (1 ≤ r ≤ k). By Lemma 1 and the fact that sid 1 , sid 2 ∈ S, we deduce that:
-tags(T σ , sid 1 ) = (tags(T, sid 1 ))σ and tags(T σ , sid 2 ) = (tags(T, sid 2 ))σ , -|tags(T σ , sid 1 )| = 1 and |tags(T σ , sid 2 )| = 1.
By definition of σ , for any sid ∈ S, we have tags(T σ , sid ) = tags(T σ, sid ). Thus, we have that tags(T σ , sid 1 ) = tags(T σ , sid 2 ) = tag. For = 1, 2, we have also that tags(T σ , sid ) = τ 1 , . . . , τ k where τ i = a i , u i for some agent a i ∈ A and some term u i . Moreover, we have that u 1 r and u 2 r are actually two distinct nonces since they have been generated by two different sessions of the role r. Thus, we have that u 1 r = u 2 r and the two distinct sessions sid 1 and sid 2 of the same role r can not have the same tag. Thus they can not be both in S.
Lastly, we have to ensure that the sessions in S are honest. By definition of secrecy, we know that sid h is an honest session. Thus, we have that tag = tags(T σ, sid h ) = tags(T σ , sid h ) = τ At this point, we have shown that ifΠ admits an attack, thenΠ admits an attack involving at most one honest session of each role. To conclude, it remains to show that this attack also exist in Π (i.e. the protocol without preamble and without tagging) what is quite obvious.
